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Determining the Rental Rate on Commercial Real
Estate Leases
Abstract
Although the theoretical framework for determining equilibrium rental rates on commercial
land is well-established, applying this framework in practice is difficult because of its depen-
dence on unobservable parameters such as land growth and discount rates. We show how this
problem can be overcome by a straightforward application of nonlinear regression methods to
actual market transactions involving leased commercial land. This approach avoids the need
to invoke ad-hoc parameter values, automatically incorporates any land liquidity premium
into rental rates, and ensures that rental, growth, and discount rates are all estimated within
a single analytically-consistent framework.
JEL Classification code: G12, L85.
Keywords: leasing, land, rental rates, maximum-likelihood.
2
Determining the Rental Rate on Commercial Real
Estate Leases
1 Introduction
In New Zealand, the use of commercial land is often separated from its ownership: firms requiring
the use of land for a business venture frequently lease the land rather than own it outright. Such
leases have the following general characteristics:
1. Rental payments are due every m years in advance and are fixed in nominal terms for T
years at which time they are reviewed.
2. There are n rent revisions scheduled during the life of the lease, i.e., the lease has a total
length of nT years.
3. The rent set at each review is based on the current market value of the land leased in an
unimproved state, with no account taken of the value of the improvements affected by the
lessee.
4. All expenses associated with the use of the property are payable by the lessee.
5. If the lease is forfeited or not renewed, all buildings and other improvements on the land
revert to the lessor free from any payment or compensation.
6. The lessee may assign, sub-lease or sell his interest in the land with the consent of the
lessor.
7. The lessor may assign or sell his interest in the land.
A crucial aspect of these leases, at both the date of inception and at subsequent review
dates, is the setting of the rental payments to be made by the lessee. Lally (2001) and Lally and
Randal (2004) develop an analytical framework for determining equilibrium rental payments,
but implementation of their approach requires knowledge of two unobservable parameters — the
expected long-run growth rate in the value of unimproved commercial land and the expected
return required by investors in such land.1 To deal with this problem, Lally presents an example
in which the two parameters are estimated independently from models that make use of historical
data on land and securities prices respectively. However, the equilibrium rental rate is sensitive
to both these parameters, so even a small error in the estimation of either parameter has adverse
implications for the accuracy of the rental payment calculation. Moreover, allowing for a range
1Lally and Randal (2004) generalise the model of Lally (2001) to allow for rent to be paid at non-annual
frequencies, but the basic framework is fully developed in the earlier paper, as is the suggested method for
applying it to practical situations. In this paper, the ‘Lally-Randal framework’ thus indicates the specific model
that appears in Lally and Randal (2004) together with the implementation approach outlined in Lally (2001).
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of possible parameter values results in an imprecisely estimated rental rate, thereby reducing its
practical utility.
In this paper, we outline a fundamentally different approach to estimating these parameters.
Our method is based on the principle that unobservable parameter values can be inferred from
observed market prices, thereby eliminating the need to invoke ad-hoc estimates derived from
historical data. Applying nonlinear regression methods to the Lally and Randal framework,
we obtain estimates of land growth and discount rates that are implied by secondary market
transactions in leased commercial land. These in turn allow us to calculate very precise estimates
of the equilibrium rental rate.
Although not previously applied to rental rates, such an approach has a rich tradition in
finance theory and practice. For example, motivated by the evidence of Chiras and Manaster
(1978) that the implicit estimates obtained from option pricing models are better forecasts of
future stock price volatility than estimates based on historical data, options traders commonly
use the volatility parameter implied by one contract to determine the fair price of less liquid
contracts written on the same stock. Similarly, Cornell (1999), Claus and Thomas (2001), Fama
and French (2002) and others argue that the discount rate implied by dividend growth models
provides a better estimate of the equity premium than historical averaging methods. In both
cases, the implicit approach is seen as being superior because it uses the information about
expectations embedded in market prices.2
As well as being of practical value, our paper makes two methodological contributions. First,
it shows how the equilibrium rental payment on any commercial land lease can be obtained
within a single theoretical framework utilising only data directly relating to land leases. Second,
because this process requires estimation of two parameters rather than one, it also shows how
the implicit method described in the above paragraph can be extended to a bivariate setting.
In the next section, we briefly describe the Lally and Randal (2004) framework, note its
key implications, and outline their suggested approach to practical implementation. Section 3
explains our alternative approach in detail, and provides an example that illustrates its principal
features. Section 4 offers some concluding remarks.
2 The Lally-Randal model
Lally and Randal (2004) consider a traditional lease (i.e., where the rental payment is expressed
as a proportion r of land value L) with the characteristics described in (i) and (ii) of the
Introduction. Using standard finance valuation techniques, they show that
r =
1
(1− tc)m
(
1−
(
1 + g
1 + k
)T)(1− (1 + kR)−m
1− (1 + kR)−T
)
. (1)
2Campbell et al. (1997) note that this approach sometimes involves strong assumptions about the specific
pricing model used to back out the parameters being estimated.
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where tc is the corporate tax rate, g is the expected long-run growth rate in the value of
commercial land, k is the expected return required by investors in such land, and kR is the
after-tax riskless interest rate.
The intuition underlying equation (??) is straightforward. In equilibrium, the current value
of the land must equal the present discounted value of all future rent payments (plus any residual
land value at the end of the lease); if this were not the case, then either the lessee or the lessor
would prefer to transact in land rather than enter the lease. Equation (??) gives the rental
rate that ensures this equality holds. Indeed, (??) is simply a mathematically-correct version
of the so-called “total return” model sometimes used by land valuers. This can be seen by
linearising (??) to obtain
k = r(1− tc) + g (2)
which states that the total expected return is equal to the after-tax rental rate plus the expected
capital gain. Equation (??) thus differs from the total return model only in that it (correctly)
takes account of the fact that rent is fixed for T years and is not reset at each rental payment
date.
The equilibrium rental rate given by (??) depends on six parameters: tc, m, g, k, T and kR.
Of these, the rent payment frequency m and the time between rent revisions T are observable
characteristics of the lease, while the tax rate tc and the riskless interest rate kR are readily
available from public sources. However, g and k are not directly observable and hence must be
estimated.
Note, however, that the rental rate r given by (??) does not depend on the individual values
of g and k, but only on their relative value, as indicated by the term φ = (1 + g)/(1 + k). If φ is
high, then the proportion of total return offered by expected capital gain is high, and hence the
required rental rate is low; if φ is low, then the proportion of total return offered by expected
capital gain is low and the required rental rate is high. As a result, alternative combinations of
g and k that yield the same value of φ have no effect on r.
Lally (2001) suggests a three-step procedure for applying equation (??) to practical situa-
tions:
1. Use 40 years of data on rural land prices to obtain an estimate gˆ of the long-run expected
rate of growth in commercial land value.
2. Use historical financial data and the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to obtain an
estimate kˆ of the expected return on land as follows:
kˆ = kR + βΦ,
where β is the systematic risk of land (its ‘beta’) and Φ is the market risk premium.
3. Substitute gˆ and kˆ, along with tc, m, T and kR into (1) in order to arrive at the appropriate
value of r.
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This procedure estimates g and k independently — the former as an average over past realisations
and the latter via the theoretical CAPM relationship between risk and return. Unfortunately,
two problems arise. First, g and k are endogenous price variables that are determined jointly, so
any attempt to estimate them independently necessarily ignores this property. This error will
be particularly problematical if the data series used to estimate these parameters are short or
ill-matched. Second, using the CAPM to estimate the expected return on land investment is
fraught with problems. In particular, the CAPM assumes that all assets are freely marketable,
perfectly divisible, and highly liquid. Although such assumptions are perfectly reasonable for
most financial markets, they are not a very good description of land markets. Sales of land
are often time consuming, while marketing of the land and transfer of title are both costly.
Land is also a lumpy asset: it is not divisible into small units to facilitate individual title to
multiple owners. As a result, the CAPM is likely to significantly understate k because it makes
no allowance for the risks associated with poor liquidity.3
Such a bias can have major implications for estimates of the equilibrium rental rate r be-
cause, as Figure 1 illustrates, the value of r given by equation (1) is highly sensitive to variations
in k. Thus, even relatively small under-estimates of k can have an economically significant im-
pact on estimates of r. For example, suppose that the true k for the lease depicted in Figure 1
is 10%; then the equilibrium r from equation (??) is 9.1%. But suppose k is wrongly estimated
to be 9%; then the rental rate given by (1) is only 8.0%, more than one percentage point below
its true value.
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Figure 1: The rental rate (r) as a function of the Land Discount Rate (k). The figure plots the
rental rate given by equation (??) for various values of k. Parameter values are m = 1, tc = 0.33, g = 0.03, T = 5,
kR = 0.045.
This source of error is potentially magnified by the independence of the k and g estimates.
Consider again the lease depicted in Figure 1 and suppose that, in addition to the underestimate
of k, the growth rate g is wrongly estimated to be 4% when it is in fact 3%. Then the rental
rate given by equation (??) is only 6.8% — 2.3 percentage points below its true value.
Clearly, even quite small errors in the estimates of g and k can result in very misleading
3Many studies in finance (e.g., Silber, 1991; Longstaff, 1995; Acharya and Pedersen, 2005) suggest that investors
rationally require a higher rate of return to invest in illiquid assets such as land, and that this premium can be
large.
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estimates of r. This suggests the need for an alternative method that either minimises these
errors, or minimises their impact on the rental rate calculation. In the next section, we describe
such a method.
3 Inferring k and g from market transactions
Using the CAPM to estimate k represents a theoretical attempt to determine the expected return
investors would require on commercial land if claims to such assets were re-packaged as securities
and traded in financial markets. Similarly, using historical data on rural land prices to estimate
the future expected growth in commercial land value assumes that past realisations from one
price series provide a useful guide to future realisations of another price series. Clearly, it would
be more desirable to estimate these parameters using information contained in commercial land
data. In this section, we describe one method for doing so, based on actual market transactions
for leased commercial land.
A relatively common transaction in commercial land is the so-called sale of lessor’s interest
(SOLI), in which the lessor sells his interest in a land lease to a third party (or sometimes the
lessee). The asset traded in such transactions offers (i) the right to receive rental payments
during the remaining term of the lease and (ii) the right to the land at the termination of the
lease. Thus, the equilibrium price PS of a SOLI that occurs S years into a lease must be equal
to the present value of the remaining rental payments plus the residual land value at the end of
the lease. In the Appendix, we show that PS is given by
PS = (1− tc)rmL0
(
1− (1 + kR)−(T−S)
1− (1 + kR)−m
)
+ (1− tc)rmLS
(
1 + g
1 + k
)T−S ( 1− (1 + kR)−T
1− (1 + kR)−m
) 1− ( 1+g1+k)(n−1)T
1−
(
1+g
1+k
)T (3)
+ LS
(
1 + g
1 + k
)nT−S
where L0 is the value of the land at the last rent-setting date. Letting rL0 = C, we can rewrite
this as
PS − (1− tc)mC
(
1− (1 + kR)−(T−S)
1− (1 + kR)−m
)
=
(
LS
L0
)
A,
where, using equation (??) and simplifying
A = (1− tc)mC
(
1 + g
1 + k
)T−S ( 1− (1 + kR)−T
1− (1 + kR)−m
) 1− ( 1+g1+k)(n−1)T
1−
(
1+g
1+k
)T + L0(1 + g1 + k
)nT−S
=
(
1− (1 + kR)−T
1− (1 + kR)−m
) (1− tc)mC
1−
(
1+g
1+k
)T
(1 + g1 + k
)T−S
.
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Therefore
QS =

(
1+g
1+k
)T−S
1−
(
1+g
1+k
)T
(LS
L0
)
, (4)
where
QS =
PS
(1− tc)mC
(
1− (1 + kR)−m
1− (1 + kR)−T
)
−
(
1− (1 + kR)−(T−S)
1− (1 + kR)−T
)
is a linear transformation of the lease’s price-earnings ratio.4 Note that all components of QS
are observable, so for any given realisation of LSL0 there is a unique value of φ that satisfies
equation (??).
Now suppose that the value of unimproved land, LS follows a geometric Brownian motion
with volatility σ and drift equal to log(1 + g).5 Then
LS = L0 exp
((
log(1 + g)− σ
2
2
)
S + εS
)
, εS ∼ N(0, σ2S),
Taking the natural logarithm of each side of (??), using the above process for LS , and splitting
k into a riskless component (kR) and a time-invariant risk premium (λ) yields
logQS = S
(
log (1 + kR,i + λ)− σ
2
2
)
− log
((
1 + kR,i + λ
1 + g
)T
− 1
)
+ εS , (5)
which is readily recognisable as a standard regression model with heteroskedastic disturbances
and unknown parameters g, λ, and σ. Although this model is nonlinear, it is straightforward to
obtain maximum likelihood estimates of these parameters from SOLI data, which can then be
used in equation (??) to arrive at a value for r.6
This approach has several attractive features. First, because it is based on actual market
transactions involving land under lease, the estimates we obtain necessarily include any relevant
allowance for liquidity risk. Second, because it involves estimating the ‘best’ combination of
g and λ, values for these parameters are obtained jointly rather than independently. Third,
all unknown parameters (the rental, growth and discount rates) are calculated within a single
theoretical framework that relates market values to the present value of future rent payments,
thereby dispensing with the need to introduce other models such as the CAPM. Fourth, if the
lease under consideration has a so-called ratchet clause (whereby rents can never fall from one
period to the next) that necessitates the use of option pricing methods, our model’s estimate of
σ eliminates the need to undertake a separate estimation of land value volatility.
4For a lease with a one-year term (T = 1) and annual rent payments (m = 1) that is sold on a rent-setting
date (S = 0), 1 +Q = PS
(1−tc)C .
5Note that this assumption is consistent with the requirement that E0[LS ] = (1 + g)
SL0.
6In applying this procedure, g, λ, and σ are chosen to minimize the weighted sum of squared errors, where
the weight allocated to each data point is the reciprocal of the number of years between the sale and the most
recent revision. It follows that sales that occur a long time into a lease cycle have a relatively low influence on
our estimates.
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Finally, one potential problem with implementing this approach is the presence of “fire sales”
in the data — leases that are sold for an artificially low price due to financial distress on the
part of the original lessor. If such transactions were prevalent in the data used to estimate (??),
then the estimated value of k — and hence r — would tend to be biased upwards. However,
(??) is only defined when QS > 0; that is, when
PS
(1− tc)C >
m(1− (1 + kR)S−T )
1− (1 + kR)−m ,
where the right-hand term is approximately equal to T − S. Consequently, equation (??) can
only be estimated when the SOLI sale price exceeds annual rent payments by some minimum
threshold, thereby automatically ruling out the inclusion of fire sales observations.
Application
To illustrate the approach described in Section ??, we utilise data from 30 SOLIs that occurred
in the Wellington region between April 1993 and March 2007.7 The details of these transactions
are listed in Table ??. As a proxy for kR, we use the 5-year government bond rate prevailing on
the date that the SOLI occurred.
Estimating equation (??) using the Table ?? data yields the results appearing in Table ??.8
The first three columns show the maximum likelihood estimates of the long-run expected growth
rate in the value of unimproved land (gˆ), the risk premium component of the expected return
on land (λˆ), and the volatility in the growth of land value (σˆ); asymptotic standard errors
for these estimates are given in parentheses. The fourth column shows the resulting estimate
of (1 + g)/(1 + k′R + λ) (φˆ), where k
′
R is the ‘current’ 5-year government bond rate, i.e., the
rate prevailing on the rent-setting day for the lease whose equilibrium rental rate we wish
to determine. To facilitate comparison with the approach suggested by Lally (2001), we set
k′R = 0.045 and m = 1.0. The final three columns then use equation (??) to estimate the rental
rate rˆ for this lease, assuming lease terms of 5, 10 and 21 years respectively. We use the delta
method (see Greene, 2003; and Xu and Long, 2005) to obtain standard errors for φˆ and rˆ.
We first check the model specification: if correctly specified, then the standardized residuals
(i.e., the residual for each SOLI divided by
√
Si) are normally distributed. The Bera-Jarque
test statistic for normality of the adjusted residuals equals 0.125. Since the test statistic is
asymptotically distributed according to χ2[2], implying a p-value of 0.939, we cannot reject the
null hypothesis that the residuals are normally distributed at conventional levels of significance.
Turning to the Table ?? parameter estimates, we see that gˆ = 0.082, λˆ = 0.118, and
σˆ = 0.264. These estimates seem sensible, insofar as they broadly correspond to those obtained
7We are grateful to Wareham Cameron Ltd for providing this information. One further transaction was deleted
from the sample because it failed to pass the fire sale test described above.
8Because information on the frequency of rent payments is unavailable, we assume that all leases in Table ??
make annual payments. We also assume tc = 0.33.
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Table 1: Data on Sales of Lessor’s Interest
This table summarises data from 30 Sales of Lessor’s Interest (SOLIs) that occurred in the Wellington
region between April 1993 and March 2007. T is the term of the lease in years, S is the number
of years between the date on which the SOLI occurred and the previous rent-setting date, C is the
annual rent payment on the lease as of the date on which the SOLI occurred, P is the price at which
the lease was sold, and kR is the after-tax 5-year government bond rate prevailing on the date that
the SOLI occurred.
SOLI T S C P kR
1 21.083 0.764 35438 390000 0.043
2 14.075 0.833 149688 1855000 0.050
3 5.000 0.833 60000 640000 0.040
4 13.997 0.842 87857 850000 0.048
5 5.000 0.917 6977 110000 0.050
6 7.000 1.303 100000 920000 0.059
7 14.000 1.314 59500 740000 0.040
8 5.000 1.750 24464 330000 0.049
9 2.964 1.881 90000 800000 0.049
10 5.000 2.167 39000 420000 0.060
11 5.000 2.250 5450 62500 0.054
12 12.000 2.333 315000 3302500 0.059
13 21.000 2.400 24625 352000 0.045
14 21.000 2.917 172500 2350000 0.038
15 7.000 3.333 28125 354000 0.059
16 21.000 3.583 12378 165000 0.049
17 5.000 4.167 516250 9831375 0.044
18 5.000 4.167 225060 4083750 0.044
19 5.083 4.917 13500 235000 0.057
20 7.000 4.919 15148 168000 0.041
21 7.000 5.667 47303 525583 0.047
22 21.000 8.658 41915 450000 0.059
23 12.000 8.917 122000 2000000 0.040
24 21.000 9.333 550400 5181500 0.048
25 21.000 9.917 76000 875000 0.039
26 20.000 10.333 6175 65000 0.040
27 21.000 12.000 514528 4100000 0.040
28 13.997 12.342 87857 6700000 0.041
29 21.000 15.083 51800 550000 0.045
30 21.083 18.667 30987 750000 0.041
from different settings. For example, Quotable Value report that the median growth in industrial
land value over the 25 years to 2006 was 10.74%, while Lally and Randal (2004) estimate the
standard deviation of rural land price growth to be 30%. Moreover, 11.8% is consistent with
risk premium estimates for illiquid assets – see, for example, Kerins et al (2004) and Acharya
and Pedersen (2005). Together, the estimates of g and k imply φˆ = 0.93 and, for a 10-year lease,
rˆ equals 9.3%.
An interesting feature of these results is that φ is very precisely estimated even though g and
λ, are not. This can be seen more clearly in Figure 2 which plots the ‘confidence ellipse’ for the
latter two parameter estimates. For any combination of g and λ inside the region bounded by the
solid curve, we cannot reject the null hypothesis (at a 5% level) that the parameters take these
values. However, we can reject this hypothesis for any combination outside the region bounded
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Table 2: Maximum likelihood estimates of equation (??) using SOLI data
Assuming annual rent payments (m = 1.0), this table uses the data in Table ?? to obtain maximum-
likelihood estimates of g, λ, and σ from equation (??). These are in turn used to obtain estimates
of, firstly, φ = (1 + g)/(1 + kR + λ), and then, from equation (??), the rental rate r for leases of
varying length. For the latter, we set kR = 0.045. Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses;
for φˆ and rˆ, these are calculated using the delta method. The second and third panels repeat this
exercise for SOLI transactions where the purchaser is an outside investor and the lessee respectively.
Sample gˆ λˆ σˆ 1+gˆ
1+kR+λˆ
rˆ
T = 5 T = 10 T = 21
Full (n = 30) 0.082 0.118 0.264 0.930 0.099 0.093 0.083
(0.029) (0.035) (0.034) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002)
Sales to outside 0.077 0.114 0.233 0.929 0.100 0.094 0.084
investors (n = 12) (0.042) (0.049) (0.048) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003)
Sales to the 0.085 0.120 0.283 0.931 0.098 0.092 0.083
lessee (n = 18) (0.040) (0.048) (0.047) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004)
by the solid curve. The narrow shape of the ellipse indicates that the estimates of g and λ are
highly positively correlated, the source of which is apparent from equation (??). Other than via
the LS term, PS depends only on φ and not on the individual values of g and λ, so the regression
model — equation (??) — is close to being under-identified. As a result of this property, any
estimation error in gˆ (which affects the numerator of φ) will tend to be substantially offset
by an estimation error in λˆ (which affects the denominator of φ). Consequently, although the
components of φ have substantial estimation errors, φ itself does not. And since the rental rate
is a function of φ only (and not g and λ separately), the precision in estimating φ feeds through
into the estimated rental rates. For example, the lease with ten-yearly rent reviews (T = 10)
has an estimated rental rate of 9.3% with a 95% confidence interval of [0.085, 0.101].
It is instructive to compare these estimates with those of Lally (2001). Using historical
financial and land price data to obtain a range of estimates for g and k, he arrives at a mid-point
rental rate estimate of 0.064 for the 10-year lease, within a possible range of [0.044, 0.096]. This
is somewhat lower than the estimates we obtain for the same lease, as would be expected given
the inability of Lally’s approach to account for a liquidity premium in land discount rates (see
the discussion in Section ??). Moreover, the possible range of rental rates of 4.4% to 9.6% is very
wide, and thus of questionable value for practical purposes. Finally, because Lally’s approach is
not based on any statistical inference, it is impossible to construct confidence intervals for these
estimates. Overall, relative to our rental rate estimates, those generated by Lally’s approach
are low, imprecise, and lack any statistical reference point. Clearly, the question of how rental
rates might best be estimated is not an economically-trivial matter.
Our SOLI data sample contains two types of transactions: those where the lease is sold to
an outside investor and those where it is sold to the lessee. In case the dynamics underlying
these two cases differ, we repeat our estimation exercise for each group separately. Although, as
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Figure 2: Confidence ellipse for average growth rate and risk premium. The point in the middle
of the graph shows the point estimate of g and λ, while the two sets of dashed lines show the 95% confidence
intervals for each parameter separately. For any combination of g and λ inside the region bounded by the solid
curve, we cannot reject the null hypothesis (at a 5% level) that the parameters take these values. However, we
can reject this hypothesis for any combination outside the region bounded by the solid curve.
can be seen in the second and third panels of Table ??, this results in slightly higher standard
errors due to the smaller number of observations, it has no meaningful effect on the rental rate
point estimates: regardless of the type of transaction, the estimated rental rate is essentially
identical to that obtained for the full sample.
4 Concluding Remarks
Disputes over commercial land rentals are not infrequent. Although the analytical framework
appropriate for resolving such disputes is now largely agreed, application of this framework to
real-world leases is made difficult by our inability to directly observe certain key parameters.
One approach advocated in prior literature is to, first, use additional analytical models in
order to estimate these unobservable parameters from historical data and, second, substitute
these estimates back into the original framework in order to calculate the appropriate rental
rate. However, the problems associated with this approach can lead to significant errors in the
estimated rental rate. In this paper, we suggest an alternative approach based on maximum-
likelihood estimation that involves only the application of the original analytical framework to
actual market transactions in leased commercial land. By using data from such transactions,
this alternative approach avoids the above-mentioned problems and yields more precise rental
rate estimates.
This approach also follows a long-standing finance tradition of using the information in
market prices to infer the values of underlying pricing parameters. The application of this
method to rental rates as we have described it here is undoubtedly capable of further refinement.
We hope this paper will encourage further research along such lines.
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Appendix A: Proof of equation (??)
Consider a commercial land lease that, at its most recent review date, was determined to have
a land value L0 and a rental rate r. If the lessor’s interest in this lease is sold S years after this
13
revision date, the equilibrium price is given by
PS = (1− tc)rmL0
(
1 +
1
(1 + kR)m
+ . . .+
1
(1 + kR)T−S−m
)
+
(1− tc)rmLS(1 + g)T−S
(1 + k)T−S
(
1 +
1
(1 + kR)m
+ . . .+
1
(1 + kR)T−m
)
+
(1− tc)rmLS(1 + g)2T−S
(1 + k)2T−S
(
1 +
1
(1 + kR)m
+ . . .+
1
(1 + kR)T−m
)
+ . . .+
(1− tc)rmLS(1 + g)(n−1)T−S
(1 + k)(n−1)T−S
(
1 +
1
(1 + kR)m
+ . . .+
1
(1 + kR)T−m
)
+ LS
(
1 + g
1 + k
)nT−S
.
Simplifying the various geometric series appearing in this equation yields
PS = (1− tc)rmL0
(
1− (1 + kR)−(T−S)
1− (1 + kR)−m
)
+ (1− tc)rmLS
(
1 + g
1 + k
)T−S ( 1− (1 + kR)−T
1− (1 + kR)−m
) 1− ( 1+g1+k)(n−1)T
1−
(
1+g
1+k
)T
+ LS
(
1 + g
1 + k
)nT−S
.
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